KTKA

JEKSRanch (anonymous) says...

I'm a Kansas rancher, I've taken the time to understand this issue, attended the comment meeting and strongly support putting the lab in our region. Our best defense is strong research and we've got it right here. As for the government study noted, do your research, most experts disagree with the contention that an island offers any protection superior to any proposed mainland site. In fact, that government concluded, '..(an island location) confers no advantage in preventing a release.'

August 20, 2008 at 7:36 a.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Save_PIADC (anonymous) says...

JEKSRanch,

A few points:

1. "Our best defense is strong research and we've got it right here."
- Actually, research with live FMD virus is currently done in only one place in the country - Plum Island. So, by your logic, that should settle the location issue if claiming " we've got it right here" is all that matters. If FMD research is such a high priority for this country (it is), why would we dismantle cohesive research teams with decades of experience working on FMD basic research and vaccine development when we are making real progress on those very vaccines?

2. "In fact, that government concluded, '..(an island location) confers no advantage in preventing a release.'"
- Go read the May 2008 GAO report. While an accidental release can happen anywhere, what an island location DOES offer is a buffer of any actual release of live virus coming in contact with susceptible animals.
Plum Island is an island and it also has a 110 mile urban "firebreak" consisting of Long Island, New York City and New Jersey before a virus could reach any concentration of susceptible species.

Let us not forget what happened in 1978 when FMD did get accidentally released from the Plum Island lab - it never left the island and the USDA was able to convince the OIE that since it never reached the mainland, the US beef industry should not be subject to an export ban. The same would likely hold true today.

In the event of a release in KS, good luck convincing the OIE not to slap an export ban on the US. But hey, it's your livelihood, not mine.

August 20, 2008 at 8:44 a.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Nelson (anonymous) says...

I work in the cattle industry and am dismayed by the media coverage of the opponents of NBAF.

The opposition is a very small group trying to frighten people who don't have all the facts. The leaders refuse to see, or conveniently ignore, the benefits of having such a facility close to livestock. There are many! Diseases like FMD could be ruled out or confirmed much more quickly in case there was an outbreak, whether accidentally or intentionally introduced.

Terrorists attacked our nation in 2001, and could do so again. Our crops and livestock are prime targets. We can keep our heads in the sand, say "not in my backyard" to the development of a lab that could help. Or we can welcome NBAF and realize the great benefits it would have in protecting our livestock and crops.

Also, I understand researchers are close to developing an FMD vaccine that would likely be widely available before NBAF is even built. So the FMD issue will be a moot point.

Regarding safety, the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta contains dozens of deadly viruses and Fort Detrick near Washington D.C. hosts the most hazardous of hot agents. No accidental releases have happened in either location.

Citing what happened at Plum Island (an outdated facility) in 1978 is going to ridiculous lengths for fear-mongering.

The media is contributing to this by giving attention to this disgruntled minority.

I encourage everyone to get the facts and support NBAF in Kansas.

August 20, 2008 at 9:12 a.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Save_PIADC (anonymous) says...

Nelson,

I suggest you review the "facts" before dismissing others.

1. Preliminary Diagnostics. This is why the government has established the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) to push preliminary diagnostics for foreign animal diseases to the states. While the confirmatory dignostics remain at Plum Island, by having preliminary tests and assays in the field, this fills the "gap" you are talking about and increases lab capacity/response nationwide. These tests were validated at, you guessed it, Plum Island.
The national agriculture industry is pretty well dispersed. Did you know that the NY State herd alone has over 1.6 million cattle? California has millions too. I don't think anyone can suggest with a straight face that Manhattan, KS is an airport hub to service sample arrival, personnel and supplies from around the US, let alone the globe. Plum is proximate to JFK and has a courier service. If we are talking about the diagnosis/tracking of novel disaeses from around the globe, being near an international airport is a good thing - this may even bolster Georgia's bid given the flight network into ATL.

2. FMD is a tremendously complex and evasive disease with 7 serotypes and dozens of subtypes. Each has to be considered as almost a seperate "disease" as a vaccine for one serotype does not offer cross-protection for another. While one vaccine is approaching licensure, this is one small part of the larger FMD puzzle. A vaccine does nothing to negate the export ban on US beef that would follow an FMD incident on the US mainland - the real economic threat from an outbreak.

3. Comparing CDC and Fort Detrick is comparing apples and oranges. BSL-4 work with farm animals is very different from what CDC and Detrick do with rodents, small mammels and primates in safety cabinets and behind shields. Large animal work involves rooms with 25+ cattle, tremendous amounts of saliva, fluids and manure where millions of virus particles are being shed each day. The researchers, caretakers and others work amidst this environment - hence the very low, but not impossible, risk of mechanical transmission.

4. 1978 at Plum Island. Explaining this historical example has nothing to do with "fear mongering" and everything to do with explaining how the mere fact that this incident occurred on an off shore island saved the US cattle industry billions from an export ban that was able to be avoided. USDA made the case (successfully) that since the release/outbreak was limited to an offshore island, the OIE export ban should not apply.

Reviewing your post, you attempt to use one part of the proposed NBAF mision (FMD diagnostics which do not require BSL-4 capability) as justification for siting in Kansas what will be THE LARGEST BSL-4 LAB IN THE WORLD.

August 20, 2008 at 10:24 a.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Yankee (anonymous) says...

Save_PIADC, as a former Plum Island researcher, I'll respond to your points. Simply put, no facility, including PIADC, currently meets the requirements identified in HSPD-9. Despite significant investments, PIADC is old, most researchers have either retired or moved on (I should know), it's hard to recruit new ones, and,
consequently, the scope of our research mission has been reduced. ARS and DHS would do well to place NBAF in a research community.

Additionally, because of capacity and biocontainment constraints, PIADC concentrates on research and diagnostic activities for only a subset of the highest-consequence foreign animal diseases and cannot facilitate expanded research into other high priority foreign animal disease and emerging threats of concern proposed by ARS at the NBAF.

Live virus FMD research on the mainland was authorized in the 2008 farm bill. Live virus FMD research is already happening at the Canadian Science Center for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg without incident.

As for your contention, that Plum Island has some special status that has prevented an export ban, you are factually incorrect. In the incidence you cited, the virus never breeched containment, thus, no ban.

Lastly, articles out here favor redevelopment of the facility for private or other public uses as opposed to an expansion of the facility. So, thanks for mobilizing an effort to save the lab, but it's not going to happen.

August 20, 2008 at 6:46 p.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

daskey (anonymous) says...

Wow, I had no idea that No NBAF in Kansas was made up mostly of livestock owners. I mean, we do have two rabbits in our backyard, but I'm not sure they qualify as livestock under even the loosest of definitions.

As these comments show, we could argue back and forth forever and never agree. Ultimately, that's not useful for anyone's cause, pro or con. For my part, I weary of being told that it will be safe and that I'm a fearmonger for pointing out that things could, no, will, go wrong. It's just a question of when, and to what degree. Anyone who preaches that containment works simply must not read the paper. There have been numerous documented breaches and lapses in procedure in recent years. The Chronicle of Higher Education published a number of articles this year about the issues at Texas A&M and elsewhere. In short: corners get cut, humans remain human, and accidents happen regardless of how good the science and technology are or how earnest and serious the good intentions of those in charge.

As far as putting it back on Plum Island, I actually believe that this facility doesn't belong anywhere. This is about perpetuating an industrial food complex and getting big government bucks. I just love how we in the US want to forbid anyone else from working with dangerous things--whether bio or nuclear agents--while we go forward with research. How dare a proponent of the NBAF call those opposed fearmongers. It's the fans of the NBAF who use the spectre of a terrorist attack to drive their agenda. Now that's fearmongering. Accidents have happened; when have terrorists used bio agents? Anthrax? That was a scientist, apparently.

August 20, 2008 at 10:53 p.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

LoverOfLife (anonymous) says...

Yankee, I get your desire for a Plum Island Eden. You've suffered enough over the past 60+ years with Plum Island's problems of mismanagement, shortages of maintanence funds, disgruntled staff, over-releases of foul water into Long Is.Sound, germ escapes within and from the lab, etc. Like when Lyme Disease and West Nile Virus, neither of which had ever been in this hemisphere, suddenly appeared with a focus at Plum Island. And thanks for sharing!
The GAO spoke with govt. and private experts in animal, zoonotic, and human pathogens from the best labs in the U.S. and abroad. Their May 22, 2008 report,"High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories, DHS Lacks Evidence to Conclude That FMD Research Can Be Done Safely on the U.S. Mainland," says: "Given the non-zero risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection."
They point out the falacy of comparing the urban Winnipeg facility, ("the location is downtown, where susceptible animals are not likely to be found in the immediate neighborhood"), with the one proposed for Kansas where .5+ million livestock are held in the same and adjacent counties. The scale of operation in Winnipeg is much smaller than that at Plum Island or the proposed NBAF which will hold more than twice the number of livestock.
Nelson, there are TWO glaring differences between the research done in BSL-4 labs in Atlanta or Ft. Detrick and FMD research proposed for the NBAF: Also from the same GAO document,
1) In a BSL-4 lab, work is done within a biological safety cabinet which provides the primary level of containment--no contact between human operator and infective material. The laboratory provides secondary containment and workers wear protective gear. On the other hand, FMD would be studied in a BSL-3Ag lab where the laboratory alone provides primary containment. Cows, pigs, and sheep don't fit into containment cabinets. They aren't as easily manipulated as a test tube or petri dish, they create lots of virus laden air (a pig can spew 400,000,000 viruses PER DAY!), contaminated bedding, excrement, and oozing dead carcasses, AND
2.) According to experts the GAO spoke with, "the most dangerous human pathogens have, fortunately, a much lower level of infectivity and transmissibility than FMD", which is the most highly infective animal virus known (only ten viral particles of some strains can infect a cow or sheep!).
Yankee, abt the outbreak of FMD in 1978 at Plum Island: it seems they had to exterminate all the animals on the island in one bloody weekend.But, someone managed to save 60 sheep from the slaughter so as not to wreck their pet research project! Well, rules are meant to be broken, right? And that brings up the messy problem of oversite of these madly proliferating germlabs.

August 21, 2008 at 2:22 a.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Save_PIADC (anonymous) says...

Yankee,

Thanks for playing. Unfortunately, as a "former Plum Island" researcher, you seem to have forgotten much since moving on to advocate placing the largest BSL-4 laboratory in the world in Manhattan, KS.

A few rebuttals ....

1. HSPD-9. HSPD-9 could get revised or go away altogether come 1/20/09 when the President who penned HSPD-9 leaves office. Moreover, HSPD-9 says nothing about a requirement for 50,000 square feet of BSL-4 laboratory space. It says "BSL-4" which doesn't necessarily mean sole use BSL-4 rooms. They could be dual 3/4 use and encompass a much smaller footprint.

2. Researchers at PIADC. Most have moved on? Really? This is news to me considering that ARS, APHIS and DHS are all actively doing work at this facility, publishing papers and getting close to the first licensed, DIVA vaccine for FMD. The researchers are drawn from around the globe and come from a number of fine universities. Recruiting difficulties? Could the fact that the facility has been on "death watch" since 2005 have something to do with this? I think it does. If you make clear that a mission will continue, you will draw the postdocs and investigators needed.

3. PIADC focusing on a subset of high consequence diseases. FMD, VSV and Classical Swine Fever, got it. Who will fund the study of these other diseases in NBAF, when USDA closed down its own African Swine Fever program for lack of funds? Sorry, but when program funding for some of the diseases currently studied are a pittance, I find it hard to believe that miraculously millions will appear to study Nipah and Hendra. Millions for Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia? Who's kidding who here. The space exists currently at PIADC for basic research on some these agents - no one is studying them. USDA closed its AFSV program and DHS hasn't started new ones.

August 21, 2008 at 3:13 p.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )

Save_PIADC (anonymous) says...

continued ...

4. Actually, FMD (live virus) could always be studied on the mainland provided the Secretary of Agriculture granted the waiver (he never has). The new Farm Bill compelled this waiver being granted to DHS if (big if) NBAF is ever built and sited on the US mainland. From what I hear this was a hard bargain driven by the Kansas delegation. Imagine that?

5. Winnipeg. Are you serious? There is NO comparison to Winnipeg's miniscule BSL-4 facility and the proposed NBAF (2x the size of the BSL-4 space at CDC). Winnipeg is in an urban setting and is a limited scale facility. NBAF will be enormous and house dozens of animals (opposed to Winnipeg's handful).

6. 1978 outbreak. FMD virus certainly escaped containment - likely through human error/mechanical transmission - hence the depopulation of the island. Because this outbreak was limited to an offshore island, USDA was able to avert an OIE export-ban on US meat products. This was mentioned at a Congressional hearing in the Spring.

7. Articles. Articles say a lot of things and lately a lot of folks are questioning the wisdom of Kansas given the livestock population there and the magnitude of your 6/11 TORNADO two blocks from the proposed facility. If memory serves me, that was the 21st tornado in your county since 1950.

I'm not holding my breath for live virus FMD on the mainland anytime soon. No matter how many millions you spend on lobbyists and PR firms, others have a say in this issue. If you take a look, industry in South Dakota and Nebraska are doing just that.

August 21, 2008 at 3:13 p.m. ( permalink | suggest removal )